Credit frictions and participation in over-the-counter markets
Journal of Economic Theory, September 2020A study on the role of credit in OTC markets in the presence of endogenous payment and inventory capacity constraints.
This paper formalizes a Nash bargaining game between two players constrained by capacity decisions made prior to entering the negotiation. In equilibrium, strategic interactions drive capacity choices to zero and shut trade down despite the existence of gains from trade. The game is embedded in a general equilibrium model of decentralized asset trade with credit frictions to investigate the interaction between availability of credit and investors’ participation, modeled through their choices of inventory and payment capacity. A partial access to credit is sufficient to restore trade. The strategic interactions between payment capacity and inventory generate endogenous heterogeneity in holdings, trade sizes and prices, and complementarity between money and credit.
Gradual bargaining in decentralized asset markets
Joint with Guillaume Rocheteau, Tai-Wei Hu and Younghwan In
A novel approach to bargaining for models of OTC markets with unrestricted asset portfolios. It is based on the notion of agendas: portfolios can be partitioned and sold sequentially, one bundle at a time.
Accepted in the Review of Economic Dynamics
We introduce a new approach to bargaining, with strategic and axiomatic foundations, into models of decentralized asset markets. According to this approach, which encompasses the Nash (1950) solution as a special case, bilateral negotiations follow an agenda that partitions assets into bundles to be sold sequentially. We construct two alternating-offer games consistent with this approach and characterize their subgame perfect equilibria. We show the revenue of the asset owner is maximized when assets are sold one infinitesimal unit at a time. In a general equilibrium model with endogenous asset holdings, gradual bargaining reduces asset misallocation and prevents market breakdowns.
Social engagement and the spread of infectious diseasesA random matching model of disease transmission based on SIS/SIR epidemiological models, with endogenous participation and precaution margins.
This paper endogenizes the spread of an infectious disease in a random matching model with pairwise meetings, where economic and social gains arise explicitly from person-to-person contacts. When agents can decide whether to engage in interactions, complementarities in the participation decisions of individuals susceptible to contracting the disease generate a large multiplicity of equilibria through adverse selection. The lower the participation of susceptible agents, the higher the prevalence of infection in the pool of participants, further discouraging the participation of susceptible agents. I document a variety of infection dynamics, including plateaus and multiple waves. Adverse selection leads to too much isolation from susceptible agents, and in the calibrated version of the model, the cost of forgone interactions offsets the welfare gains of flattening the curve and mitigating the human toll. When agents cannot opt out of the market but can instead choose whether to wear a mask, the equilibrium is unique. In the calibrated model the human toll is lower than when considering the participation margin, yet at a significantly smaller cost.
Work in progress
Do financial frictions shift the Beveridge curve?A study about the impact of corporate credit constraints on hiring and vacancy yields, and their potential to shift the Beveridge curve.
I propose the deterioration of credit availability as a novel explanation for the outwards shift of the Beveridge curve in the US following the Great Recession. The model implements a twist in Wasmer and Weil (2004): instead of looking for a loan to finance their vacancy costs, firms borrow to cover a fixed cost of hiring required to convert a match into a hire. This timing allows labor market efficiency to drop following a productivity shock. I build a monthly index of loan approval and conduct an empirical exercise that confirms the relevance of the credit channel.
Unstructured Bargaining in the Laboratory
Joint with John Duffy and Daniela PuzzelloLaboratory experiment with minimal structure seeking to identify how individuals bargain over two-dimensional terms of trade (prices and quantities) and how bargaining outcomes vary as a function of the buyer's payment capacity.
We report on an experiment in which buyers and sellers engage in semi-structured bargaining along two dimensions: how much of a good the seller will produce and how much money the buyer will offer in exchange. Our aim is to evaluate the empirical relevance of two axiomatic bargaining solutions, the generalized Nash bargaining solution and Kalai’s proportional bargaining solution. These bargaining solutions predict different outcomes when buyers are constrained in their money holdings. We find strong evidence in support of the Kalai proportional solution and against the generalized Nash solution when buyers face liquidity constraints. Our findings have policy implications, e.g., for the welfare cost of inflation in search-theoretic models of money.
Frictional Cash Management
Joint with Sebastien Lotz and Cathy ZhangWe combine a theory of financial intermediation with a theory of households' money demand to provide microfoundations for portfolio-adjustment costs in Baumol-like models.
We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model to study the role of banks in creating and reallocating liquidity and households’ cash management. Our approach combines a theory of financial intermediation where banks swap assets with different liquidity properties with a micro-founded model of households’ money demand. Households and banks negotiate the terms of the contract in an over-the-counter market which includes an exchange of illiquid assets for liquid bank liabilities and an endogenous transaction cost for cash management. We show how the agenda of the negotiation matters and discuss implications for monetary policy transmission through money growth, open market operations, and quantitative easing on interest spreads between liquid and illiquid assets, asset holdings, and transaction costs.